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Abstract
This paper seeks to make sense of the impact of globalization on nonprofit, nongovernmental
organizations. We argue that globalization processes have contributed to the rising numbers and
influence of NGOs in many countries, and particularly in the international arena.  International
NGOs and NGO alliances are emerging as increasingly influential players in international
decision-making, and we discuss some of the roles they can be expected to play in the future. We
consider whether the emergence of domestic and international NGOs as important policy makers
strengthens or weakens the future of democratic accountability, and we suggest several patterns
of interaction among civil society, government and business in future governance issues.
1Globalization, NGOs and Multi-Sectoral Relations
by
L. David Brown, Sanjeev Khagram, Mark H. Moore & Peter Frumkin
Introduction
The recent WTO meeting in Seattle produced a remarkable spectacle for those interested in the
processes of "globalization" and "governance”, and the role of nongovernmental organizations in
shaping international governance.  On one hand, there was the WTO: an emergent international
institution that convened the world's economic ministers to negotiate the trade agreements that
would allow money, goods, and people to wash across the boundaries of the international political
system. Much was at stake in these agreements for the world's countries and their citizens. Their
structure would channel the courses of Schumpeter's "gale of creative destruction" across the
world. 1  The economic, cultural and political fortunes of countries and their inhabitants would be
buffeted by the powerful transnational forces. Traditional cultures would flourish or be shoved
aside. Natural resources would be preserved or extracted.  The poverty of billions might be
alleviated or intensified by the distribution of expanding wealth and opportunity.
Despite the magnitude of the stakes and the range of the stakeholders affected, the meetings had
few of the distinguishing characteristics of democratic policy making.  The WTO itself was
simply a collection of governments that had come together to negotiate economic trade
agreements. There was no sovereign power or authority to be wielded; only the pressure to
collaborate for mutual advantage as perceived by the participants. If any important decisions were
made, they would be made through negotiated agreements. The discussions would be highly
                                                          
1 Schumpeter,  Joseph A.  (1950) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 3d edition (New York, Harper and
Row, 1950)  p.84.
2technical -- of intense interest to some, but mostly un-interpretable by ordinary citizens. It was
expected that the ministers would do their business, and then go home.
And then, , the citizens of the world showed up to ask questions of these ministers and their
meeting. Some 1300 groups—committed to varied visions of the public interest—assembled in
Seattle to ask questions, make protests, and impose demands on the conferees. By the time the
tear gas cleared, a reality recognized by many international actors for years had become highly
visible to the U.S. public and the rest of the world: Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and
civil society alliances organized to achieve public purposes have become players in international
governance..
Of course, neither globalization, nor a form of international governance, nor the emergence of a
kind of transnational civil society undergirded by nongovernmental organizations are entirely
new. Globalization (understood as the thickening of the networks of interdependence  spanning
international boundaries that accompanies increasingly rapid and inexpensive movement of
information, ideas, money, goods and people across those boundaries2)  has been increasing for
centuries.  NGOs and civil society alliances have also been active in international governance and
policy-making for many years.  Anti-slavery and women’s rights advocates, for example, have
build international NGO alliances to shape national and international policies for many decades.3
What is new is the recent explosion in numbers, activity, and visibility of international
initiatives by civil society actors on a variety of issues, at least in part linked to the rapid
expansion of globalization of communication, transportation, and production.  Indeed, it
                                                          
2 See Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye,  Joseph. (2000), Power, Interdependence, and Globalism, in Power
and Interdependence, Addison-Wesley, forthcoming.
3 See Keck, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists without Borders. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
3seems important that accelerated globalization has apparently coincided with the
blossoming of civil society groups across the globe. The talent and instinct for voluntary
association to address social problems is increasingly visible in the developing countries of Asia,
Africa, and Latin America, and in the transitioning countries of Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Socialist Republic. Citizens associations have emerged to solve local problems, to provide
needed services, to press for better government, to ally with like-minded groups from other
societies, and to reshape the emergent processes of international governance.
An important question is whether the blossoming of civil society at both national and
international levels is merely co-incident with globalization, or whether there is something about
the processes of globalization that spawns these enterprises. An equally important question is
what impact these enterprises can be expected to have on the processes of globalization
themselves. Will they tend to accelerate globalization by effacing national boundaries and uniting
people in common ideological commitments? Or, will they impede globalization by allowing
those who feel pressured by the process to develop new enclaves which can be defended against
global trends? A third question is what impact these organizations can be expected to have on the
quality of governance at both the national and international level. Will such organizations
strengthen democratic accountability and make governments more responsive to the will of their
peoples, and can they help citizens deal with the pressures of marketization and the growing
power of corporate actors?  Or will they become agents for the more or less idiosyncratic social
goals of the social entrepreneurs who found NGOs and the aid organizations and foundations that
support them?
The purpose of this paper is to try to make sense of this new world in which economic, cultural,
and political processes wash over national boundaries; that is, in which "globalization" is a
4powerful trend shaping the lives of nations, their inhabitants, and the global commons. More
particularly, the aim is to begin to try to understand how a new class of economic, cultural, and
political actors -- civil society organizations -- are being shaped by, and are themselves shaping
the processes of globalization, and what their implications might be for the quality of governance
at both national and international levels in the years ahead.
We will argue in this chapter that globalization processes have contributed to the rising numbers
and influence of NGOs in many countries, and particularly in the international arena.
International NGOs and NGO alliances are emerging as increasingly influential players in
international decision-making, and we will discuss some of the roles they can be expected to play
in the future. We will also briefly consider whether the emergence of domestic and international
NGOs as important policy makers strengthens or weakens the future of democratic
accountability, and we will suggest several patterns of interaction among civil society,
government and business in future governance issues.
Globalization as A Multi-faceted Process.
The thickening networks of interdependence created by increasing flows of, ideas, goods, and
people across geopolitical boundaries "shrinks the world," not only physically (by bringing us
into more immediate, insistent contact with one another), but also psychologically (by making us
more aware of our similarities and differences, and our complex interdependencies).4 This
"shrinking world effect" shapes individual consciousness and action. And, as importantly, it
shapes the ways in which individuals combine together in collective efforts to manage their lives
and their circumstances. It attacks and undermines some institutional arrangements that have in
the past done the work of providing to individuals both an individual identity and some kind of
5satisfactory collective response to their circumstances. It stimulates the need and provides the
opportunities for individuals to form new collective processes and institutions that can
complement or replace the old institutions. In these respects, globalization is affecting both the
demand and the supply of "governance" (understood as the processes and institutions that
individuals, associations, and states create to manage their collective lives).
Globalization has intensified with changes in the international political system, in the
international market economy, and in transportation and information technologies. The collapse
of the Soviet Union  and the end of the Cold War has spawned an international movement to
towards democracy. Formerly totalitarian regimes that had sustained themselves at least in part by
acting as allies to either the United States or the Soviet bloc were suddenly exposed by the
collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the cold war. They were suddenly vulnerable to their
own citizens and their long suppressed demands for democratic regimes, and could find no help
from the powers that had once competed for their favor to secure cold war advantages. The
internationalization of the market spurred by the free movement of capital and technology in
pursuit of both labor and customers created new wealth and optimism throughout the world, but
also left those at the bottom of the economic and social ladder vulnerable to exploitation even
when things were going well, and to dashed hopes when business cycles or economic
mismanagement undercut economic growth. The rapid movement of people and information
across the globe accentuated the grossly unequal political and material conditions in which the
world's diverse populations were living, and stimulated a widespread demand for greater political
and economic equality as well as a broader sense of our economic, political, and moral
interdependence.
These changes have contributed to a shifting balance in the roles of the state, the market,
and the civil society, both in individual countries and in the international political economy. In
                                                                                                                                                                            
4  Keohane & Nye, 1999, op. cit.
6the past, looking at the international political economy, one would have conventionally said that
the dominant actors were sovereign states. They seemed to be in charge of what happened within
their borders. What happened across their borders—in the international commons–emerged form
interaction among individual states.   In the last decade, however, the power of the market has
expanded and the role of the state has been reduced in many countries, in the West and North as
well as the East and South. The shift to "open macro-economies" has reduced the power of
individual states to manage their own economic destinies. And since economic destinies were
often important in influencing the stability of political regimes, the vulnerability of political
regimes to the international economy has been accentuated. In the face of the increased
vulnerability to powerful economic forces that were shaping the world, and the inability of states
to offer much protection, movements have arisen to provide some kind of collective response to
the changing circumstances. Sometimes these have been grass roots movements in particular
parts of particular developing countries. Other times, local grass roots movements have spread to
become national movements. Still other times, local movements have made alliances with
international organizations to help them achieve national purposes, or to lend their weight to
international efforts.  The emergence of international NGOs, networks, coalitions, and social
movement organizations as potentially important political actors at both national and international
levels has been stimulated by the need to create collective responses to threatening circumstances,
by the generally favoring influence of democratic ideals, and by the collapse of national capacity
to repress these efforts.5
Globalization provides information and perspectives never before available to many people,
transporting them to new possibilities of international and cosmopolitan consciousness. The
                                                          
5 Lindenberg, M., & Dobel, J. P. (1999). The Challenges of Globalization for Northern International Relief
and Development NGOs. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 28(4), 4-24, and Mathews, J. (1997).
PowerShift. Foreign Affairs, 76(1), 50-61.
7increased flows of information and people contribute to a global homogenization
(“Americanization?”) of tastes, norms, and concerns. McDonald’s hamburgers are available in
Beijing and Buenos Aires, and language and music imports raise the hackles of cultural guardians
in Paris and Singapore.  At the same time, the assault of external ideas and values can inspire
fierce defense of traditional values and styles of life.  NGOs may express and help to create
cosmopolitan and international perspectives and they may also express and defend the values and
concerns of citizens alienated from globalized perspectives and cultural “imports.”  Thus NGOs
may express or enable globalization, and they may also ardently resist globalization in a kind of
sectarianism within and across national boundaries (e.g., militant Islamic movements).
Civil Society and NGOs as Emerging Actors in the International Political Economy
The concept of “civil society” has been defined in many ways.6  For the purposes of this chapter
we focus on civil society as an area of association and action independent of the state and the
market in which citizens can organize to pursue social values and public purposes which are
important to them, both individually and collectively.7  Civil society actors include charitable
societies, churches, neighborhood organizations, social clubs, civil rights lobbies, parent-teachers
associations, unions, trade associations, and a wide range of other agencies.
                                                          
6 See for example See for example Cohen. J.L. and Arato, A. (1997), Civil Society and Political
Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Walzer, M. (1991). The Idea of Civil Society. Dissent(Spring),
293-304; and Bratton, M. (1989) Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa, World
Politics, 41, 407-430.
7 Overviews of these perspectives have been developed by Wuthnow, R. (1991). Between States and
Markets: The Voluntary Sector in Comparative Perspective. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, and
Walzer, 1998, op cit. See also Tandon, R., & Naidoo, K. (1999). The Promise of Civil Society. In K.
Naidoo (Ed.), Civil Society at the Millennium (pp. 1-16). West Hartford: Kumarian Press.
8Civil society actors can be distinguished from the government and business sectors on a number
of dimensions.8 While government seeks to provide public order and public goods, and uses its
authority to raise the money and create the desired public conditions,  and business works to
provide private goods and services through the mechanisms of voluntary exchange, civil society
actors seek to actualize the values and purposes of citizens and citizen groups through their
independent voluntary efforts, as well as through the influence that citizen groups can exert on
both business and government.  If governments mobilize resources through legitimate coercion
and taxation and businesses mobilize resources though resource exchanges, civil society
organizations mobilize resources through appeals to values and social purposes. While businesses
are oriented to private interests and governments are oriented to public interests, civil society
actors focus on the interests of social groups within the society – including those groups
disadvantaged by existing arrangements.
We are primarily concerned here with civil society agencies, often referred to nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), that focus on issues like poverty alleviation, human rights, environmental
degradation, and other issues of social, economic and political development.  These NGOs carry
out a range of activities, such as providing services to poor populations, building local capacity
for self-help, analyzing and advocating policies that support disadvantaged constituencies, or
fostering research and information-sharing.9 Some NGOs focus on serving their members, and
others focus on serving clients outside the organization.  Some operate domestically, working on
projects whose impacts may be felt from the village level to national policy to international
arenas.  Examples from the developing world include:
                                                          
8 Brown, L. D., & Korten, David  C,. (1989). Understanding Voluntary Organizations ((Public Sector
Management and Private Sector Development Working Paper No.258). Washington, DC: The
World Bank, and Najam, A. (1996). Understanding the Third Sector: Revisiting the Prince, the Merchant,
and the Citizen. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, XX(y), 203-219.
9 See Vakil, A. C. (1997). Confronting the Classification Problem. World Development, 25(12), 2057-2070.
9• The Grameen Bank began as a Bangladeshi NGO experiment in micro-lending to poor
entrepreneurs who had no collateral for bank loans.  After demonstrating that small
groups who shared responsibility for the loans had a repayment rate vastly superior to
ordinary borrowers, the Grameen Bank expanded its operations to serve more than
2,000,000 poor, mostly women entrepreneurs in Bangladesh, and catalyzed an
international micro-credit movement supported by major donor institutions around the
world.10
• The Narmada Bachao Andolan, an organization representing thousands of people
“ousted” from their land by India’s Narmada Dam project, has successfully challenged
the decisions of central and state governments of India and the World Bank to build the
dam in violation of Bank policies for resettling oustees.  The transnational alliance
organized by the NBA has contributed to worldwide rethinking of the value of large
dams, changes in policies and practice at the World Bank, and the establishment of the
World Dams Commission to review the performance of large dams around the world.11
Both these examples describe initiatives launched by NGOs in developing countries that have
expanded to affect international policies and programs.  The micro-credit movement promises to
foster grassroots participation in developing economies,12 and the struggles over large dams have
                                                                                                                                                                            
Clark, J. (1991). Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Organizations. West Hartford, CT:
Kumarian Press.
10 Yunus, M. (1997). The Grameen Bank Story. In A. Krishna, N. Uphoff, & M. Esman (Eds.), Reasons for
Hope . West Hartford: Kumarian Press.
11 Khagram, S., Dams, Democracy, and Development, forthcoming; and see Udall, L. (1998). The World
Bank and Public Accountability: Has Anything Changed? In J. A. Fox & L. D. Brown (Eds.), The Struggle
for Accountability: NGOs, Social Movements, and the World Bank . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
12 Rhyne, E., & Otero, M. (1992). Financial Services for Microenterprises: Principles and Institutions.
World Development, 20(11), 1561-1571.
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produced changes in international policies and decision-making institutions that have effects far
beyond any single country or region.13
Many other international NGO initiatives have been launched from the industrialized world.
Recent efforts by an international coalition to ban landmines succeeded in creating an
international treaty in the teeth of resistance by many governments, and a long struggle over sales
of infant formula to mothers in the developing world with no access to safe drinking water
eventually produced a near-unanimous agreement on a code of conduct for babyfood sales in the
UN.  Wherever they were initiated, all four initiatives ultimately involved active participation by
NGOs and civil society actors from both developing and industrialized countries, and so tapped a
wide range of information and perspectives on the issues in question.
NGOs that seek to expand their impacts beyond local and national initiatives faced significant
organizational problems.  One option is the establishment of an international NGO (INGO) that is
organized to work across national boundaries.14  Transparency International, for example, has
member organizations in more than 30 countries that provide national support to the international
initiative to identify and reduce corruption. A second way to organize for international action is to
create a transnational network whose members share values, information, and a common
discourse that enables them to coordinate their actions.15  An example of a transnational network
is the emergence of widespread linkages among NGOs and other actors concerned with
environmental issues over the last two decades.  Such networks allow exchange of information
and strategies, but they are less useful for sustained coordination of activity or mobilizing large
numbers of people for contentious politics.  A third option is the creation of transnational
                                                          
13 See Khagram, forthcoming, op. cit.; Fox & Brown, 1999, op. cit.
14 The Yearbook of International Organization identifies INGOs as organizations with voting participation
from at least three countries.
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coalitions among actors to coordinate shared strategies and tactics for influencing intentional
decision-makers.16  A coalition among national and international environmental NGOs and
directors of the World Bank produced a reform in the Banks information access policies as well
as the creation of an Inspection Panel to investigate complaints about impacts of Bank projects. 17
Finally a fourth organizational form, transnational social movement organizations, links actors
with shared purposes across countries to mobilize members for contentious action on behalf of
shared goals.  This is the most demanding form of international civil society organization, and
remains relatively rare.18  The international women’s movement comes close to being a
transnational social movement, at least on some issues where it can mobilize members to
challenge opponents in several countries.  The different organizational forms offer different
capacities for international action as well as increasing demands for coordination of resources and
commitments.
While civil society organizations are not a new phenomenon, there has been a dramatic increase
in their importance in many arenas over the last two decades.  This change has been characterized
by at least one researcher as a  “global associational revolution” that may as important to the end
of the 20th century as the rise of the nation state was a century earlier.19 By the count of the
Yearbook of International Organizations, the number of international NGOs has grown more than
fourfold in the last decade.20  While there is a great deal of variance in the size and activity of the
                                                                                                                                                                            
15 Keck & Sikkink (1998), op. cit., describe “transnational advocacy networks” that have played central
roles in struggles over environmental policy, women’s rights, and human rights.
16 Khagram , forthcoming, Chapter 1.
17 Udall, 1998, op. cit.
18 Khagram, forthcoming, op cit.
19 Salamon, L. M. (1994). The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector. Foreign Affairs, 73, 109-116.  The Johns
Hopkins studies of the nonprofit sector in many countries has provided the base for comparative analysis
across many regions.  As on of the leaders of those studies, Salamon can base this assessment on
impressive amounts of data. See also Salamon, L., & Anheier, H. (1998). Social Origins of Civil Society.
Voluntas, 9(3), 17-46.Salamon, 1994.
20 Economist, (1999).  Citizen’s Groups: The Nongovernmental Order, Will NGOs Democratize or Merely
Disrupt Global Governance? The Economist, December 11, 1999; Boli, J., & Thomas, G. M. (1999).
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civil society across countries, the sector is growing rapidly in many countries and regions.  It is
estimated, for example, that more than 100,000 civil society organizations have emerged in
Eastern Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall, and more than 1,000,000 NGOs are operating in
India21  Civil society organizations are increasingly active in many different arenas.
In part the rise of civil society organizations and, in particular, development-oriented NGOs is
related to the availability of resources to support them.  The growing interest of foundations,
international donors, and even governments in supporting nongovernmental agencies has made
funds available and created incentives for entrepreneurs to create NGOs that can make use of
those funds.  The result in many countries has been a proliferation of NGOs that are organized
more to take advantage of those resources than to accomplish their nominally value-based
missions.  Not all civil society actors are equally serious about achieving social missions or public
purposes, nor do all subscribe to the values of tolerance, reciprocity, and nonviolence that some
argue are central to the definition of civil society.22  As it has grown, civil society has spawned a
great diversity that is now pushing in a multitude of different, even competing, directions.  Civil
society actors, as will become clear below, can easily become confused about their legitimacy and
accountability; they can focus on single issues to the exclusion of understanding the larger
context; and they may be better at blocking than implementing large-scale initiatives.  But they
are increasingly influential actors in many circumstances.
                                                                                                                                                                            
Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, p. 14.
21 Smith, J., Chatfield, C., & Pagnucco, R. (Eds.). (1997). Transnational Social Movements and Global
Politics: Solidarity beyond the State. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
22 Karina Constantino-David has described the variety of NGOs that emerged in response to changing
circumstances in the Philippines. Constantino-David, K. (1992). Scaling up Civil Society in the Philippines.
In M. Edwards & D. Hulme (Eds.), Making a Difference (pp. 137-148). London: Earthscan.   Most analysts
favor quite definitions of civil society actors that include many competing actors.  Others, such as Tandon
and Naidoo, 1999, op cit., exclude organizations that are not committed to core civil society values like
tolerance, nonviolence, and reciprocity.
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Globalization Impacts on NGOs and Civil Society
In what ways does globalization affect NGOs and civil societies within nations and across
national boundaries?  While our main focus here is on international NGOs and the evolution of
transnational civil society, we begin with a discussion of the impacts of the globalization on
domestic NGOs and national civil societies. The reason is that international initiatives often have
their roots in national issues around which civil society actors first organized – and then found
that international initiatives were required to attack the problems involved.  Even when
international movements begin with international NGOs, they often need domestic NGOs to give
them the political base and legitimacy they need to survive and be effective. And, it may well be
that some of the most important effects of international NGO activities are their impacts on
domestic civil societies.
Globalization and National NGOs
Countries vary considerably in the extent to which civil society organizations are active in
national life as well as how open they are to the impacts of globalization.23  Some regimes appear
determined to remain isolated from external influences (e.g., North Korea or Burma), while
others are committed to control any non-state agencies that might be a threat to state power (e.g.,
China).  When national doors are opened to information, trade, and travel, however, the impacts
on civil society and its organizations may be profound. The torrent of information now available
through media, videos, faxes and the internet can very quickly raise the awareness of people at all
levels of the society about how others live, spread ideas about factors that constrain their own and
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their neighbors’ lives, and disseminate a wide range of alternatives to past practices.  Increased
consciousness about the wider world is almost inevitable.24
Exposure to this flood of information can challenge old beliefs and expectations, reawaken
loyalties to old values and social identities, or provoke intense discussions of highly-charged
concepts like “women’s liberation,” “land to the tiller,” or “ethnic cleansing.”  Information flows
that resonate with core social values can be the basis for the emergence of civil society
organizations or social movements that speak with powerful new voices in national policy and
governance processes.25 These voices may be perceived to be particularly threatening when they
are backed by resources from outside the country, such as international NGOs or coalitions.
Contact with the larger world may also exacerbate both the fact and the awareness of economic
discrepancies.  Economic stabilization can provide more goods at decreased costs to individuals
with resources, and it may offer new jobs as corporations relocate to use cheap labor.  But it may
also result in layoffs of government employees in response to structural adjustment programs,
marginalize groups dependent on declining exports, or demonstrate through business failures how
difficult it is to meet the standards of global competition.  When the “poor get poorer,” the clients
to be served or mobilized by NGOs expand in number and in needs.
Globalization forces at the national level can reduce state controls over the economy, increase
pressure for democratic accountability, or raise questions about state sovereignty.  These
developments can create political space for civil society organizations as alternative sources of
                                                          
24 A major approach to adult education that has emerged from grassroots “conscientization” efforts in
Brazil focuses on helping the poor conceptualize their political situation and the forces that keep them poor.
See Paolo Freire (1971) Pedagogy of the Oppressed,  New York: Herder and Herder. The growing
omnipresence of television and other forms of information and communications technology can alter the
political awareness of those whom in earlier decades had no idea about happenings in the wider world.
25 Khagram, forthcoming, op. cit.
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services once provided by the state, as watchdogs over and advocates for government policy
formulation and implementation, as policy entrepreneurs or implementers with state partners, and
as social innovators to guide improved services. When globalization expands political space, civil
society actors may emerge to respond to the concerns of impoverished and marginalized groups
that would remain voiceless under prior regimes.
It is not immediately obvious that political, cultural and economic facets of globalization will
necessarily co-vary or reinforce one another. Globalization will not simultaneously highlight the
importance of core cultural values, or open more political space for civil society initiatives, or
create economic consequences that exacerbate poverty. Governments may open doors to
international markets while trying to control the political implications of globalization, or vice
versa.  They may close their boundaries to cultural impacts as well. In general, however, the more
open the country is to globalization, the more we would expect civil society organizations to
become important actors in the country’s development. This is a function of three factors: (1)
globalization has impacts on consciousness—both liberating and counter-revolutionary—that are
likely to be expressed via civil society organizations; (2) globalization is likely to place enhanced
emphasis on the political ideologies of individualism, freedom, and equal rights for which NGOs
are both a product and an exemplar; and (3) globalization invites in international actors (INGOs,
international agencies) that actively promote and strengthen the emergence of national civil
societies.
Globalization and International NGOs and NGO Alliances
The increases of information flow, human travel, and trade associated with globalization have on
the whole made the formation and operation of international NGOs and NGO alliances easier and
less expensive. The costs of international organization and coordination have been drastically
16
reduced by the shrinking globe.26 Globalization has also contributed to the rise of new problems
to which international NGOs and alliances may be particularly relevant.  The rise of transnational
environmental problems, such as global warming, ozone depletion, and cross-border pollution,
has sometimes severely taxed the capacities of inter-state institutional arrangements.27
International NGOs and alliances have emerged to respond to problems associated with
globalization in several arenas, delivering services and responding to disasters, analyzing and
advocating policy alternatives, and promoting learning will be differently affected in delivering
services, advocating policy changes, or promoting learning and problem-solving about new
issues.
International NGOs and NGO alliances have been responding to disasters and delivering services
for many years, and this is still the most common international NGO role.  Most of these
organizations originated in industrialized countries; many have branch organizations and large
projects in developing countries. A recent conference of the eleven biggest international relief and
development organizations (e.g., CARE, OXFAM) identified  a number of challenges associated
with globalization processes. 28  The end of the cold war, for example, has increased the
frequency of intrastate conflicts and internal refugee flows, and public cutbacks have reduced the
ability of state agencies deal with conflicts and humanitarian crises.  Globalization has increased
poverty in many regions, and declining development assistance funds have increased competition
among international NGOs for resources.  An important consequence of these trends is
significantly increased demand for assistance, and seriously reduced capability to meet that
demand. In short, for international service delivery NGOs, globalization is escalating needs for
service while resources are declining. Many of these agencies also feel pressure from private and
                                                          
26   Boli & Thomas, 1999, op. cit.; See also Keck & Sikkink, 1998, op cit., and Fox & Brown, 1998, op. cit.
27 Young, O. R. (1997). Global Governance: Drawing Insights from Environmental Experience.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
28 Lindenberg & Dobel, 1999, op. cit.
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public donors to become more “business-like” and “results-oriented” in response to widespread
emphasis on market-based approaches to management.29   In addition, the rise of civil society
organizations in many developing countries is pressing international service NGOs to turn over
local operations to Southern NGOs. This change threatens to redefine their primary tasks and
render their staffs largely obsolete.  The effects of globalization are thus pressing many
international service NGOs to undertake fundamental changes.
For international NGOs and alliances that focus on policy analysis and advocacy, the thickening
networks of global interdependence created by globalization have raised a variety of issues in
which civil society have important interests.  Some of these initiatives have formed initial
organizations at the international level and then built alliances with NGOs at the national and
local levels.  Transnational advocacy networks concerned with the environment, corruption, and
human rights, for example, have often been launched by international NGOs that later allied with
national and local partners.30  In other cases, national NGOs and social movements have built
coalitions with international allies to influence national and international policy-makers.  For
example, the indigenous peoples’ movement in Ecuador sought international allies in a struggle
over land reform,31 and similar groups in Brazil allied with international actors to stop proposed
dam construction.32  In both top-down and bottom-up alliances, the processes of globalization
have built awareness of alliance possibilities, enabled easy exchange of information, and
contributed to personal contacts among key actors. The targets of advocacy campaigns (e. g., the
World Bank) have often challenged the legitimacy of international NGOs that claim to represent
                                                          
29 See Edwards, M. (1999`). International Development NGOs: Agents of Foreign Aid or Vehicles for
International Cooperation? Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 28(Supplement), 25-37, and Dichter,
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Fox & Brown, 1998, op cit.
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grassroots constituents, and so contributed to building genuine coalitions across large differences
in wealth, power, and culture.
A third focus for a growing number of international NGOs and alliances is interorganizational
learning and problem-solving.  In part these alliances and INGOs have emerged to respond to the
emergence of global problems whose solutions depend on input from many different
perspectives.  The World Dams Commission, for example, is drawing on the perspectives of
many different interested actors in assessing the impacts of large dams in economic and social
terms.  The International Forum on NGO Capacity Building has generated assessments of the
capacities and needs of  NGOs on three continents, and proposed joint problem-solving initiatives
with donors and governments to respond to those needs.  Easy exchange of information and
engagements in consultations enabled civil society actors to identify and agree on the nature of
problems, to explore underlying causes, to assess alternative solutions, and to agree on solutions
and implementation plans across geopolitical and cultural boundaries that would seriously
impeded joint learning and problem-solving a decade ago.
Such cross-cultural contacts often involve work across differences in norms and values that can
set off highly-charged misunderstandings and conflicts.  As value-based organizations,
international NGOs and NGO alliances are often highly sensitive to such conflicts.  They can play
critical roles in articulating and synthesizing issues across value differences and so help to
mobilize publics on international concerns and problems. The Global Network on Violence
against Women, for example, has helped to identify and illuminate the common themes in
movements focused on violence problems around the world—dowry deaths in India, female
genital mutilation in Africa, spouse abuse in North America, rape and torture of political
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prisoners in Latin American.33  International NGOs and NGO alliances may be peculiarly suited
to recognizing, articulating, and synthesizing integrative frameworks to contain values-based
perspectives and conflicts that shape global problem-solving in the future.
Civil Society  and International Governance
Globalization processes are clearly having an impact on civil societies and NGOs at both national
and international levels.  Do those impacts have consequences for international governance and
policy making? Recent research suggests that international NGOs or NGO alliances are playing
active roles in the formulation and implementation of many international decisions and policies.34
They have shaped international events level in at least the following ways:
(1) identifying problems and globalization consequences that might otherwise be ignored,
(2) articulating new values and norms to guide and constrain international practice,
(3) building transnational alliances that advocate for otherwise ignored alternatives,
(4) altering international institutions to respond to unmet needs,
(5) disseminating social innovations that have international applications,
(6) negotiating resolutions to transnational conflicts and disagreements, and
(7) Mobilizing resources and acting directly on important public problems,.
In these activities, international NGOs and NGO alliances have been building the attitudes and
institutions for a transnational civil society that makes a different kind of international
governance possible.
                                                          
33 Keck & Sikkink, 1998, op. cit.
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Civil society actors are often the first to use global information networks to identify international
problems that are not raised or resolved by existing international arrangements.  International
NGOs involved in service or advocacy activities are often in close touch with otherwise voiceless
populations, and so recognize problems that remain invisible to other actors. Since their financial
support depends on public visibility of problems, they also develop linkages to media to raise
public awareness of critical problems. Transparency International, for example, raises awareness
about problems of corruption around the world and its impact on development.  The Worldwatch
Institute publishes a “State of the World” report that helps global audiences to recognize threats
to the global environment. Raising public awareness of problems is often a prerequisite to action,
and international NGO initiatives can create global discourse on emerging problems.
A second role for NGOs in the global arena is to help construct international values and norms
that can guide future international policies and practices.35  Thickening interdependencies are
raising issues whose normative implications are unclear or divers across cultures. International
NGOs and civil society alliances can help articulate values and norms to interpret new problems,
such as the issues of environmental sustainability, and in articulating practices, such as
environmental impact assessments, to guide future policies.  The construction of shared
international values and norms is central to the creation of a global culture,36 and international
NGOs can be important catalysts for constructing parameters that shape meaning and
interpretations in the shrinking world.
Increasingly during the last decade, transnational civil society alliances have been central to
campaigns to formulate and enforce global public policies in response to critical problems.37
These campaigns have often been mounted where existing institutional arrangements would not
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or could not respond to emerging problems.  For example, the International Baby Food Campaign
focused on the marketing of infant formula in countries where the lack of safe water made the use
of the formula very dangerous.   That campaign eventually produced a code of conduct adopted
by the UN and monitored for compliance by a network grounded in the original international
coalition.38  Similarly, the International Rivers Network has been critical to assessing the impacts
of dams and pressing for global policies to limit their destructive impacts.39  The alliances
organized for these campaigns often became important resources to future campaigns on other
issues.40
A fourth role for international NGOs and NGO alliances is to create or reform international
institutions to improve response to global problems.  The World Bank, for example, has been the
target of transnational alliances concerned with reducing the secrecy of their operations and
creating avenues for local stakeholders to protest Bank projects that violate of its own policies.41
These campaigns can create more responsive institutional arrangements for the future.  In other
cases campaigns have created new institutional arrangements to solve emerging problems. The
World Dams Commission, for example, is a product of a series of campaigns against large dams.
It is systematically evaluating actual dam performance.
International NGOs may affect the impact of globalization by creating and disseminating social
innovations that affect international governance processes.  The demonstrations at the WTO
meeting in Seattle are only the latest manifestation of the innovation of “NGO Forums” that have
with increasing frequency brought hundreds or event thousands of NGOs to high visibility
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international meetings in the last decade, such as the Earth Summit in Rio or the Women’s
Meeting in Beijing.  These meetings place the discussions at these meetings under a global
spotlight as well as afford opportunities for dialogue and advocacy to international publics as well
as government representatives.42  Expanded and thickened webs of interdependency across
national and regional boundaries have facilitated the dissemination of micro-credit innovations
from the Grameen Bank or policy influence strategies from the indigenous people’s movement of
Ecuador.
In contrast to their roles as spark plugs for change and confrontation, NGOs may also act as
mediators or catalysts for resolving conflicts at national and international levels.  NGOs have
played a part in trying to manage serious conflicts with regional effects in Guatemala and Sri
Lanka as sources of early warning or preventive action.43
More generally international NGOs and NGO networks have demonstrated the capacity to
mobilize people and resources for international action on important public problems.  In some
cases NGOs play primary roles in identifying problems or articulating value positions; in others
they take direct action to invent or press for problem solutions.  NGO alliances were central, for
example, in mobilizing support for the adoption of the international ban on landmines, in spite of
resistance from many national governments.
International NGO and NGO alliance engagement in global decision-making and institution-
building expands the variety of actors who aware of and active in international governance. The
civil society actors who went to Seattle broadened the issues to be discussed by the WTO by
pressing for more attention to labor rights and environmental regulations. Civil society actors may
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also help articulate the values, norms, and critical inceptions of a shared global culture.
International governance in a globalized world is increasingly responding to a wide range of
actors and interests.44
Civil Society and Future International Governance
We have argued that globalization has contributed to the dramatic rise of civil society
organizations around the world, though their impacts have been uneven across countries and
issues.  Some countries have been particularly open to developments associated with
globalization—rapid communication and wide dissemination of information, quick travel and
transportation, political democratization and fragmentation, economic dynamism and
concentration of wealth, or cultural homogenization and polarization—that support the
emergence of civil society organizations as important actors.  International NGOs and NGO
alliances have taken roles in service delivery and disaster relief, policy analysis and advocacy,
and social learning and problem-solving.
We also argued that international NGOs and civil society alliances have demonstrated the
capacity to engage in international debates that affect the processes and institutions for
international governance.  Past initiatives have increased access for international NGOs and NGO
alliance to policy debates and institutions.  But their roles in these forums depend in large part on
how they resolve questions about their own legitimacy and accountability.  This section will first
consider the issue of NGO legitimacy and accountability in the international arena.  Then we will
turn to civil society relations to other sectors—government and business actors—and explore the
possibilities for multisectoral relations in international governance.
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 NGO Legitimacy and Accountability
To advocates of both domestic and international NGOs there is little doubt that their emergence
and growing influence is consistent with the ultimate goals of enhancing the quality of democratic
governance and the degree of democratic accountability of international governance decisions
and institutions.  That  result is  fostered by the ways in which  NGOs support the transformation
of individual consciousness, enable newly-empowered grassroots individuals and groups to have
a voice in decision-making, and enforce accountability for governments and businesses at both
domestic and international levels.
But to many in centers of power challenged by NGOs—including international governance
organizations, states, and national or international business organizations—the legitimacy of
NGOs seems quite suspect.  Behind the appearance of popular mass movements may be
charismatic individuals supported by foundations with their own views of the public interest.  Just
whom do these NGOs represent?  And should decisions that affect many interests and often
billions of people be shaped or blocked by their actions?
Whether the emergence and active participation of both domestic and international NGOs in
policy-making processes should be viewed as an advance in the quality of democratic governance
seems to depend crucially what kind of claim they can make to holding both domestic
governments and international governance arrangements to account.   It is probably best to think
of “accountability” as a relationship: To say that an agency is accountable is to suggest that there
is someone who can demand that it live up to its commitments at the risk of sanctions if it fails to
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do so.45  Accountability lies in (1) the actor’s commitments to another; (2) the substantive
character of those commitments, and (3) the means that the other has to ensure that those
commitments are honored.  Some accountability relationships are hierarchical (e.g., principal-
agent relations46) and focus on the accountability of the agent to the principal; others are more
“mutual” in that that imply reciprocal claims (e.g., contracts that establish obligations for both
parties).  Accountability is desirable because it increases the incentives for actors to perform as
expected, and that reliability can improve performance as well as the relationships among the
parties.
Accountability is at issue in at least two ways when civil society actors participate in international
governance processes.  First, do international NGOs and NGO alliances increase or decrease
democratic accountability in their challenges to international institutions that formulate and
implement international policies or problem solutions?  If those alliances represent the world’s
citizens (or even a substantial part of them), their interventions arguably may increase the
democratic accountability of the target institutions.  But this representativeness is a very difficult
claim to substantiate. And international NGO alliances might actually reduce democratic
accountability if they promoted policies that ran against the interests of their constituents.
Democratic accountability might also be grounded in the claim that these organizations represent
transcendental purposes rather than particular groups or individuals. In this view, there are urgent
rights to freedom from political oppression, from the threat of starvation or malignant illness,
from the darkness of illiteracy, and so on, that are fundamental to human rights. Since democratic
accountability has to be about a governing entities ability to deliver on these fundamental human
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26
rights.  NGOs that align themselves with these causes are advancing democratic governance.
There can be no democratic governance locally or internationally when citizens lack the
necessary conditions for exercising the rights and responsibilities of democratic participation.
An alternative claim to legitimacy is that the institution in question has failed to live up to its own
policies and standards for practice.   The transnational NGO coalition against the World Bank’s
Narmada Dam loan argued that the project failed to meet the Bank’s policy on resettlement of
people displaced by the dam, and an independent Commission of investigators ultimately agreed
that those standards had not been met.47 In this case the legitimacy of the challenge grows out of
the Bank policies rather than the representativeness of the coalition or its advocacy of
fundamental rights, though questions may be asked about its standing to raise the issue
A second important set of issues revolves around the institutional accountability of the
international NGO or alliance itself—to what extent can other actors subject the alliance to
sanctions for failure to meet its commitments?  This is a complex question for international
NGOs and NGO alliances, since their missions often commit them to serving multiple
constituencies (donors and allies as well as clients) at different levels (local, national,
international). Those constituencies often have very different capacities to impose sanctions for
failures to meet commitments: Grassroots groups may find it difficult to influence distant
international NGOs even when they are nominally part of the same coalition. Successful
international NGO alliances often build “chains” of accountability, in which the influence and
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sanctions are transmitted across many links (e.g., local to regional to national to international) to
span the organizational distance between international NGOs and grassroots groups.48
Accountability also turns on clear definitions of performance expectations by the parties to the
accountability relationship.  Different forms of alliance vary considerably in how explicitly goals,
strategies, and responsibilities are formulated.  Networks, organized around shared values and
largely focused on information-sharing, create fewer foci for accountability than coalitions, which
share strategies and action plans.  Social movement organizations are yet more explicit about
goals, tactics, and mutual expectations in the face of contention with powerful opponents.  As
transnational alliances become more focused on shared strategies and tactics, we might expect
their investments in mutual influence and accountability to rise.49
Whether the engagement of international NGOs and NGO alliances promotes democratic
accountability of international multi-sectoral problem-solving turns in part on the extent to which
they develop their own capacities for institutional accountability to their members and
stakeholders.  The issue of civil society accountability and its importance for their future roles in
national and international decision-making with actors from other sectors has drawn increasing
attention from students of civil society and its international alliances.50  These issues become
increasingly central as civil society actors seek ways to work effectively with government and
business actors.
Multi-Sector Relations: Civil Society, State, and Market
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Whether NGOs can become effective agents of improved democratic accountability and
international problem-solving may depend crucially not only on how they develop and manage
themselves, but also as importantly on how they interact with other powerful sectors of society
that can claim to represent public interests and to pursue public goals.  The experience of the last
decade suggests that international NGOs and NGO alliances are more often effective in blocking
decisions than they are in catalyzing large-scale action that solves critical problems.  In part this
asymmetry reflects the relatively low level of resources available to civil society actors, at least as
compared to actors in the state and market sectors.  In part it also reflects the different
comparative advantages of the sectors: the state and the market are inherently better equipped for
large scale initiatives, just as the civil society may be better equipped for small-scale local
experiment and innovation.
There are many issues on which the different sectors can go about their activities without
engaging each other.  But there are many other issues on which businesses, governments, and
civil society organizations seek to influence one another.  Unfortunately, the gulfs in interests and
perspectives that separate the sectors make intersectoral misunderstanding and conflict very
common.  Misunderstandings are particularly likely when the parties are also separated by
perceived power differences and by ideological interpretations of difference. Civil society
actors—especially those that serve disadvantaged or marginalized groups—may be particularly
sensitized to power differences and collisions of values.
One general pattern of intersectoral relations that may emerge from disputes over interests and
values is a kind of intersectoral polarization that is characterized by value-laden stereotypes,
struggles over power and resources, and resistance to joint action even when some interests are
clearly shared.  In this pattern, each sector emphasizes its own interests and perspectives, sees
little legitimacy or relevance in others’ values, aspirations or resources, and seeks to achieve its
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goals in spite of or at the expense of the others even when there might be significant gains
available from cooperative action.
Intersectoral polarization can produce struggles to control decisions in domains where many
actors have important stakes. Governments and intergovernmental organizations may seek to
exclude multinational corporations and transnational civil society alliances from input to
important international decision-making processes, even when they have critical information
about the issues or large stakes in decision outcomes.  Indeed, much of international relations
theory focuses almost exclusively on states as the major legitimate actors in international
governance.51  In other situations multi-national corporations and financial markets may shape
international decisions, and seek to exclude governments and civil society actors. Some analysts
have argued that the recent rise of the international market has largely established that
“corporations rule of the world”52 and that governments and civil society actors have become
largely irrelevant on may critical international decisions.  Still others argue that international
NGOs and NGO alliances now have the power to block many international decisions.  While the
enormous diversity and fierce autonomy of civil society actors make a coherent international
hegemony on one or a few of NGO actors unlikely, some observers  suggest that on some issues
are already subject to a kind of special interest gridlock in which international NGOs and NGO
alliances make international decisions and progress impossible.53
Some disagreement and struggle for influence among the sectors on controversial issues is
probably inevitable.  Indeed, some degree of contention is probably desirable for developing a
thorough analysis of issues and generating creative solutions to problems.  Analysts of conflict
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and negotiation have described several approaches to dispute resolution, including reconciling the
interests of the parties, adjudicating the rights involved, or establishing which party has the power
to impose their will.54  These approaches vary in the costs they impose: Negotiations that
reconcile differences are generally less costly than court battles to adjudicate rights or power
struggles to establish supremacy.  Adjudications and contests may be necessary when the parties
disagree about what rights apply or who has more power—but those processes may also be costly
in many ways.
Interest-based negotiation and problem-solving across sectoral differences has been used to
generate solutions to a variety of problems in the last two decades in both the industrialized
world55  and in developing countries.56 Multi-sector cooperation is characterized by mutual
influence across the sectors and a willingness to negotiate agreements that take into account the
concerns and capacities of many parties.  In this pattern interaction among governments,
businesses, and civil society actors can produce appreciation of each other’s concerns and
aspirations, recognition of each other’s resources, and negotiated agreements that all the parties
regard as fair and acceptable.  Multi-sectoral cooperation has been useful for development
purposes in very diverse settings.  For example:
• In rural Madagascar access to market centers has been restricted by the lack of roads, and the
government has had few resources for road-building or maintenance.  With assistance from
international donors the government has developed partnerships with local community
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organizations and commercial road construction firms to create and maintain hundreds of
kilometers of rural roads.  In the partnerships, private firms construct roads and instruct the
community organizations in their maintenance; the government authorizes the communities
to collect tolls from road users; and the community maintains the roads with their own labor
and funds from the tolls.  The partnership utilizes the comparative advantages of the different
parties to produce gains for all of them.57
• The city of Cleveland, Ohio was a notorious example of urban decline in the 1970s as a
consequence of outmigration of local industries, a series of riots and  ethnic tensions, power
struggles between business and government actors, and a variety of other factors.  Local
government and business leaders organized a variety of innovative multi-sectoral task forces
and committees to explore ways to better understand problems, build shared commitment
across many institutions and sectors to solve them, and implement the host of innovative
initiatives that emerged from their deliberations.  Over the next decade the city, once derided
as “the mistake on the Lake,” emerged as an exemplar of urban renewal and reform on the
basis of the joint initiatives that united actors from many different sectors, classes, ethnic
groups, and cultural backgrounds. 58
While multi-sector cooperation is increasingly common at the national level in many countries, it
is not yet common at the international level.  In part this is because cooperation across sectoral
differences is intrinsically difficult, and parties are not likely to struggle with its challenges if the
issues of rights and power—the alternatives to dispute resolution by reconciling interests in multi-
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sectoral negotiations—remain ambiguous.  In the international arena it is often ambiguous
whether appeals to rights or to power will be more effective in serving the interests of the parties
than negotiating interests.  In some arenas, however, long struggles among governments,
businesses, and civil society organizations have established that the costs of adjudications and
power struggles are likely to be very high, and negotiating interests has become an attractive
alternative.  Thus the World Commission on Dams, which includes representatives of all three
sectors, has become an arena in which important policies and decisions can be debated and
evolved, in part because it provides an alternative to a history of struggles that have been costly
for many participants.  As international NGOs and NGO alliances engage in more successful
campaigns to influence international governance, the use of arrangements that enable multi-sector
cooperation can be expected to increase as the rights and powers of civil society actors become
better understood and accepted.  Investigators from a variety of disciplines are already describing
the rise of intersectoral cooperation in many settings.59
Governance grounded in multisectoral decision-making may further complicate already thorny
questions of performance measurement and accountability.  What criteria might be used to assess
the performance of multi-sectoral initiatives?  Is it important to use criteria that reflect core
concerns of each sector in this assessment?  Should other criteria be used that reflect value
created across the sector?  The following list illustrates criteria drawn from the market, state, and
civil society sectors as well as a final cross-sector possibility:
• Efficient use of resources: Does the multisectoral initiative efficient mobilization of resources
and information for effective and sustainable problem-solving?
• Democratic accountability: Does the multisectoral initiative promote responsiveness and
accountability to key stakeholders in the issue?
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• Actualization of core values: Does the multisectoral initiative recognize, express and support
core values and norms of stakeholders?
• Social learning: Does the multisectoral initiative promote better understanding and
innovation that serves the stakeholders in the problem domain?
Multi-sectoral cooperation is difficult and expensive in time and resources.  It is not appropriate
for all decisions.  But it may be more expensive in the long run to try to handle some problems
without multi-sector participation.  Civil society organizations and alliances increasingly will
challenge and obstruct international policy-making that does not take the interests and
perspectives of their members into account.  Multi-sectoral cooperation can reconcile civil society
actors’ interests and mobilize their comparative advantages with those of intergovernmental
agencies and multinational corporations in some circumstances, and contribute to more rapid and
responsive social learning as well.
Conclusion
We have argued that civil society organizations are increasingly important actors in international
arenas as well as in many nations.  Their emergence in the last few  decades is associated with
and in part caused by the forces of globalization, which have contributed to the personal,
economic, political and social dynamics that give rise to stronger civil societies.  The rise of civil
society organizations has been uneven across countries, though openness to globalization seems
in general to be associated with growing strength and diversity of NGOs and other civil society
organizations.  The growth of international NGOs and NGO alliances has also been shaped  by
globalization, with impacts particularly visible for provides of services and disaster relief, policy
analysis and advocacy, and social learning and problem-solving.  At the international level NGOs
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and NGO alliances have identifies emerging problems, articulated new values and norms, created
or reformed institutional arrangements, fostered innovations in international practice, and helped
resolve conflicts and manage differences.  These contributions to international governance in turn
highlight problems of democratic and institutional accountability of international NGOs and
NGO alliances, and the possibilities of multisectoral cooperation to solve complex problems of
international governance.
The growing recognition of civil society actors as legitimate and valuable actors in international
governance may be a prelude to increased use of multi-sectoral cooperation to grapple with
international governance issues.  As governments and businesses accept civil society actors as
representing real rights and wielding real power, the lower costs of reconciling interests in
collaborative processes may encourage much wider efforts to work together.   On the other hand,
the potential reach and resources of  the other sectors is potentially a significant threat to the
autonomy and independence of civil society actors. Finding ways for all three sectors to work
together while preserving their distinct identities and capabilities is an important challenge for the
future.
.
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